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Rethinking Retirement Policy in Massachusetts

Rethinking
Retirement Policy
in Massachusetts
Ellen A. Bruce
Women are significantly poorer than men in old age. One major cause of
women’s disproportional poverty is retirement income policy that bases
pensions and savings incentives on earned income. This paper describes the
structure of our retirement policies and argues that some policies should be
implemented that are not associated with earned income as a way to both
support women’s caregiving roles and insure their economic well-being in
old age.
omen have a greater chance of being poor in old age than men.
They enter retirement with fewer assets, less pension income, and
lower Social Security benefits. Because they have a longer life expectancy,
their savings must last longer and their income will probably be eroded by
inflation. All of these factors tend to reduce their income in their later years.
Women also have a greater risk of chronic disability than men, which means
their health and long-term care expenses are greater. Older women in
Massachusetts face all of these challenges. The challenge that Massachusetts policy makers face is how to reduce these risks. What policies can the
state implement that will enable all older persons, but women in particular,
to live with more economic security in their later years?

W

How well someone does in retirement is a combination of their retirement
income (Social Security, pensions, annuities, IRAs, and so on), savings,
insurance (health and long-term care), and their expenses. Women do poorly
compared to men on most of these fronts, primarily because most retirement
income is based on lifetime earnings. Since women’s wages are lower than
men’s and their work histories are shorter, their lifetime earnings are less.
An initial decision for policy makers is whether policies should encourage
women to adopt work patterns closer to men’s as a way to increase their
retirement income, or whether retirement policy should separate the calculations of benefits from prior earnings. While women’s wages should be
equal to those of men doing similar work and barriers to jobs should be
Ellen A. Bruce is a lawyer, an associate professor of Gerontology, and director of the
Pension Action Center at the Gerontology Department of the McCormack Graduate
School, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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eliminated, women provide a valuable service to society in their roles as
unpaid caregivers for children, the disabled, and frail family members.
Policy makers could encourage and reward those roles if retirement income
were not based solely on paid work.
OLDER WOMEN’S ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES
The poverty rate for people over age sixty-five in Massachusetts is 8.9
percent. Couples over age sixty-five are relatively well off with a poverty
rate around 4 percent.1 But singles and especially women are much worse
off. Also, as people age they are economically more vulnerable; people over
eighty-five are poorer than younger elders.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, unmarried women over the age of
sixty-five in Massachusetts have poverty rates of 14 percent compared to
single men with poverty rates of 11 percent. If you look at single women
and single men at or below 150 percent of poverty, rates increase to 31
percent for single women and 25 percent for single men.2 In short, a sizable
proportion of single older men and women in Massachusetts are living in or
very close to poverty. Policy makers should be concerned about all older
single persons, but since single women over sixty-five make up a much
larger proportion of the over sixty-five population in Massachusetts than
single men (37 percent vs. 12 percent), this article addresses the causes of
older women’s economic insecurity.
Women’s economic disadvantages stem from two sources: they are paid
less and they spend less time in the paid workforce. It is generally agreed
that women earn less than men after holding constant other variables.3 How
much less is in dispute, but it is commonly asserted that women earn 77
cents for every dollar a man earns.4 This gender earning difference increases with age. Women in their twenties earn salaries closer to their male
counterparts than do older women.5 Since many private and public pensions
are weighted toward earnings in the years closest to retirement, this greater
differential is important.
Women spend less time in the paid workforce than men, primarily because of women’s care-giving responsibilities for both children and elderly
disabled relatives. In 2005, women had a labor force participation rate of
59.3 percent compared to men’s participation rate of 73.3 percent.6 When
they are in the workforce, women are more often working part-time. In
2005, 25.2 percent of working women were employed part time as compared to 10.7 percent of working men.7
The result: when it comes to retire, women have fewer retirement resources (Social Security or Pensions or IRAs) than men, and they have
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greater potential expenses. Their longer life expectancy means that their
money must last longer. Women also have a greater likelihood than men of
needing long-term care8 which can be financially catastrophic.
Social Security, Massachusetts public pensions, and private pensions all
base their benefit calculations on past work history and salary. Social
Security’s formula and its benefits, however, are structured in a manner that
is more beneficial for women than the other two.
SOCIAL SECURITY
Social Security, like private pensions, uses wages as a base for determining
a worker’s benefits. The result is what you would expect: The average
Social Security retiree benefit for a woman is $826/month compared to
$1,077/month for a man.9 Although Social Security has several features that
benefit women’s lifetime patterns of work, it is still based on a formula that
averages the amount of money earned during each year over a thirty-fiveyear work history. If someone was not in the workforce for thirty-five years
or did not pay into Social Security, a zero is placed in the no-earning year,
bringing down the amount of the benefit. People who work fewer years and
earn less have lower Social Security benefits.
Two aspects of Social Security mitigate the effect of basing retirement
income on work and wages. First, the Social Security benefit formula is
weighted toward lower income workers, so that first $656/month of earnings counts more toward your benefit than subsequent earnings. This
formula results in people in the very low income brackets having their
benefits replace up to 57 percent of their pre-retirement income, while
workers at the higher income brackets have a benefit that replaces only 33
percent of their pre-retirement income.10 Thus, while people with higher
earnings will receive higher Social Security benefits, people with lower
earnings will receive a higher percentage of their prior earnings. In this
way, the Social Security benefit formula is progressive. The second design
element of Social Security the helps women in old age is that the program
offers a 50 percent benefit to the spouse of the worker as well as a benefit
for the worker. Therefore, when a man retires and is entitled to $1000/
month from Social Security, his wife will be entitled to at least $500/month.
The spousal benefit is unusual in that the wife is entitled to it while the
husband is living and the husband’s benefit is not reduced because his wife
receives the benefit. This hypothetical couple will receive $1500/month. If
the wife has an earning record of her own, she cannot receive both her own
retirement benefit and the spousal benefit from her husband’s work, but she
will receive the greater amount. So if she is entitled to $300/month on her
own work history she will receive that and an additional $200/month as a
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spouse. In this way, Social Security is supporting wives of workers in addition to retirees.
Widows and widowers are also entitled to a benefit from the retiree’s
work. In the example above, the wife would receive $1,000/month on the
death of her husband. The survivor is entitled to the worker’s benefits but
does not continue to get the spousal benefit. Thus a couple with Social
Security income in the above example will have $1,500 a month to live on,
but if the husband dies, the wife will have only $1,000 a month.
A third provision of Social Security serves women’s longer life expectancy. Social Security pays a cost-of-living adjustment on the full amount of
the benefit each year, therefore the benefit is not eroded by inflation as are
most other monthly retirement benefits. These Social Security plan design
elements, (spousal benefits, Cost of Living Adjustments [COLAs], and
weighting benefits toward low-income workers), blunt the economic disadvantages women typically have entering retirement, even though the formula is based on wages and work history.
Two provisions of Social Security work against women in Massachusetts
who work for a public entity. The public pension offset provision of the
Social Security law reduces the amount a public employee may receive from
their spouse’s Social Security by a portion of their own public pension. The
result may be that the public employee will not collect anything under their
spouses’ Social Security. For example, a woman who has worked as a
school teacher, contributed to the Massachusetts Teachers Retirement
System, and earned a public pension of $1,000 a month will have her entitlement to her spousal benefits from her husband’s Social Security reduced by
two-thirds of her public pension. If her husband’s Social Security benefit is
$1,500/month, her spousal benefits would be $750/month without the offset.
Once the offset is applied (two-thirds of $1000 or $666) her spousal benefit
will be only $84 ($750 – $666 = $84). If her teacher’s pension is $1,500/
month she will receive no spousal benefit as the offset (two-thirds of $1,500
or $999) will entirely eliminate the spousal benefit of $750. A second provision, the Windfall Elimination Provision, reduces the amount of the public
employee’s Social Security benefit earned from previous work. These two
provisions are a result of Massachusetts public employees not contributing
to Social Security. These provisions are not well known and because of them
women who are retiring often find they have less income in retirement than
they had anticipated.
PRIVATE PENSIONS
Private pensions are structured very differently from Social Security. There
are two basic forms of private pension, the defined benefit plan and the
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defined contribution plan. The defined benefit plan is the traditional pension
plan where the company is responsible for funding the plan and making
investments, and provides retirees with a monthly income over their lifetime. The defined contribution plan is what most people think of as a 401(k)
plan. The company contributes a set amount to the worker’s retirement each
year the worker is employed with the company, but does not guarantee any
monthly benefit. Typically the benefit is paid in the form of a lump sum and
often can be rolled over into another retirement account if the worker
leaves before retiring. Often employees must contribute a portion of their
wages in order to receive the employer match.
Neither structure has provided particularly well for older men or women.
Only 44 percent of retirees age 65 and older had any income from an
employer-sponsored pension plan in 1998. Women were less likely than men
to have pension income from either their work or their spouses’ work; 56
percent of men had pension income compared to 36 percent of women.11 In
addition, women’s income from pensions is less than men’s. The median
monthly pension receipt for men in 1998 was $700, for women it was $346.
The future of pensions as a source of income is very much in flux. Over
the past twenty years there has been a dramatic shift from defined benefit
plans to defined contribution plans in the private sector. In 1983, 62 percent
of workers with pension coverage had only defined benefit plans compared
to 12 percent who had defined contribution plans, and 26 percent had both.
By 2004, only 20 percent of workers with pension coverage had only defined benefit plans, 63 percent had only defined contribution plans, and 17
percent had both.12 Therefore, among workers with pension coverage, those
with defined benefit plan coverage dropped from 88 percent to 37 percent in
that twenty year period while workers with defined contribution plan
coverage increased from 38 percent to 90 percent in the same period.
The implications of this dramatic shift are not yet known but there are
some indications that are worrisome. First, there has not been an increase in
the number of individuals participating in private pension plans.13 In a
defined benefit plan, anyone who was covered by a pension plan automatically participated. This was in large part because defined benefit plans did
not typically have employee matches so the employee did not have to make
any decision. In most defined contribution plans, employees are required to
contribute to the plan in order to receive the employer contribution; if they
don’t contribute, they are not in the plan. Thus, although more companies
are offering pension plans, a smaller percentage of employees are participating, resulting in somewhat stable participation rates. In 2004, only 44
percent of working women and 48 percent of working men participated in a
pension plan.14 The participation rate for women has increased slightly and
the rate for men has decreased some.
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Two other concerns about the trend toward defined contribution plans is
the amount of money being accumulated in retirement accounts and the
form that money is taken at retirement. Women have accumulated much
less in these accounts than men. Bajtelsmit and Jianakoplos found that in
1998 women had lessened the gap in accumulated savings in defined contribution balances from 40 percent of men’s balances in 1989 to 44 percent in
1998.15 While this is good news, it shows that women are still very far
behind and this data includes only women with defined contribution plans.
How money is taken out of the pension plan at retirement is also of
concern for women. A lump sum payment may be spent before death,
leaving the women without adequate income in her later years. To avoid
that risk, a woman can purchase an annuity on the private market, but in
Massachusetts she will have to pay more than a man pays for the same
monthly benefit. But if the pension plan pays the annuity, it can not pay
more in benefits to a man than to a woman because federal law prohibits
it.16 The sale of annuities is regulated by state law and only one state,
Montana, prohibits the differential pricing of annuities based on sex. Therefore, it is in a woman’s interest to have the plan pay the annuity instead of
buying one on the private market. Purchasing through the plan would also
save on marketing costs associated with the sale of private annuities. The
downside of annuities, whether paid by the plan or purchased privately, is
that they typically do not increase in later years and thus are eroded by
inflation over time. An annuity bought by a women at age sixty-five will
have less than half the purchasing power when she reaches age eighty-five.
Private pensions have some protections for spouses. First, federal law
requires that defined benefit plans and any defined contribution plan that
offers benefits in the form of an annuity must have the wife’s agreement in
writing if the pension is not taken in the form of a 50 percent joint and
survivor annuity. This protection involved the wife in the decision of
whether the benefit should continue if the husband died before the wife.
Unlike Social Security, the decision to elect a survivor benefit for the
worker’s spouse reduces the amount of a pension benefit the worker will
receive during his/her lifetime. Therefore, including the spouse in the decision is important as he or she will have the most to loose if the worker dies
before the spouse and a joint and survivor annuity is not chosen. The
percentage of married men electing a joint and survivor benefit increased
from 41 percent to 71 percent between 1975, when federal law made the
joint and survivor option the default election form, and 1994.17 With the
advent of defined contribution plans that pay benefits only in a lump sum,
this protection for wives is eliminated.
Federal law also provides protection for divorced spouses. Upon divorce,
the court may divide a husband’s pension and issue a Qualified Domestic
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Relations Order (QDRO), which will allow the pension plan to pay the exspouse her portion of the pension directly. With the growth in defined
contribution plans, this protection will become less important because
individual accounts can more easily be divided. The ability of married
couples or divorcing couples to divide pension money between them is an
important tool in protecting the economic security of the women. To the
degree that pension money and tax policy ties retirement money to the wage
earner, the non-wage earner or lower-wage earner partner will be at a
disadvantage in retirement.
STATE PENSION SYSTEM
The Massachusetts public pension system is structured very differently than
Social Security and most private pensions. Public employees in Massachusetts, unlike many other states, do not participate in the Social Security
system and as such the public pension system plays the role of both Social
Security and private pensions for the workers in the system. The protections
the Social Security system offers women do not extend to the working
women and spouses of workers in the Massachusetts public sector. Most
notably, a spouse of a Massachusetts retiree is not entitled to receive any
portion of the retiree’s pension during the retiree’s lifetime. A wife would
only be entitled to a pension from her husband’s work if he elected upon
retirement to take Option C which would give him less in his monthly
pension but would provide his wife with two-thirds of his pension upon his
death.18 A public employee who does not choose a joint and survivor option
(which the employee can do without the wife’s consent) risks leaving her
with no support upon his death. If she did not work, she would have no
Social Security, no pension from her husband’s work, and no pension in her
own right because of a lack of a work history. Such a woman might apply
for federal and state support in the form of Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) if she had no savings, leaving her in poverty.
The state pension system has some features that are very beneficial and
some that are harmful to state workers. One element that hits women
particularly hard is the vesting provisions. Employees are required to have
ten years of full-time work before being eligible for any pension. Part-time
work is credited on a pro rata basis so a part-time worker could take up to
twenty years before being eligible to receive a pension. These vesting
requirements are unusually restrictive and work to deny benefits to many
employees in the state system.19
For full-time, full career employees, the public system in Massachusetts is
relatively generous. An employee can earn a benefit equal to 80 percent of
her final three-year average salary if she has worked in the system for a
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long time. An 80 percent benefit is considered a good benefit by most
financial planners. Massachusetts also provides for regular cost-of-living
increases on the first $12,000 of yearly benefits so there is some (but not
total) inflation protection.20 For most retirees, this COLA is less generous
than the Social Security benefit that it replaces. Social Security’s average
yearly benefit for a retiree in June 2006 was $12,086. Thus, beneficiaries in
the Social Security system who have retirement benefits above the average
are earning a COLA on more of their benefits than state workers receiving
above the average Social Security. For a couple whose average yearly
Social Security benefit is $18,090, the state COLA is much less generous.21
THEORY

VS.

REALITY

How well different retirement programs provide for the elderly remains a
question of importance. Social Security with its guaranteed benefits and
cost-of-living protection is credited with lifting many elders out of poverty,
especially women.22 The state pension system helps a small set of older
women but fails many more because of weak spousal protections, partial
COLA protection, and long vesting requirements.
In theory, defined contribution plans could hold promise for women.
Under 401(k) plans, the vesting time is shorter, allowing workers with
shorter job tenure, like many women, a chance to accumulate some retirement wealth. Defined contribution plans are also easily portable, allowing
individuals to move their pension plans when they change jobs. The individual accounts offered by defined contribution plans also can continue to
increase in value, making contributions made early in one’s career more
valuable than an entitlement under a defined benefit plan. This flexibility
could work to women’s benefit if they work before having a family and can
save for retirement at that time. And, importantly, small employers are
more likely to offer a defined contribution plan, providing the potential of
greater private pension plan coverage. These elements have helped women
somewhat as seen in the increase in pension coverage of women in recent
years.
After almost thirty years of experience with 401(k) plans, however,
retirement security has yet to be reached and women may be further behind.23 Younger workers are less likely to participate than older workers.
Low-income workers contribute less than higher income workers. And most
problematic, 45 percent of participants in 2004 cashed out their 401(k)
balances when they left their jobs, instead of rolling over the balance to an
IRA.24 This cash out is done mainly by younger workers and by those with
small accounts but it causes the loss of retirement income. An analysis done
by Munnell and Sunden indicates that the promise of large account balances
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accumulating by age sixty-five has yet to become a reality. For many, such
balances never will be a reality. Munnell and Sunden took a hypothetical
worker with earnings of $58,000 at retirement who had contributed 6
percent of salary to a plan to which the employer was contributing 3 percent to and compared the hypothetical worker’s account balance to the
actual 401(k)/IRA balances of those aged 45–54. Had they contributed and
invested as expected their account balance would have been $169,300 but
the average actual account balance was $49,000, very substantially less.
There are many reasons people do not participate in defined contribution
plans; most notably, they need all of their pay check to make ends meet.
They could also be saving money for major expenses prior to retirement
such as a house or education. Other reasons include not understanding or
mistrusting the plan, fear of losing money, and inertia. One easy way to
increase participation would be to not require a match from the employee,
but instead have the plan fully funded by the employer as the defined benefit
plans were.
Women’s history of accumulating large amounts of savings is not particularly good although some research has shown that women are doing a
better job in saving before retirement than ten years ago. Bajtelsmit and
Jianakoplos found in an examination of the Survey of Consumer Finances
that women’s average accumulated defined contribution balances measured
in constant 1998 dollars, increased from $16,372 in 1989 to $25,020 in
1998. These amounts, however, are still much lower than men’s, which were
$41,149 in 1989 and $57,239 in 1998. Women’s IRA accounts were also
smaller than men’s in 1998, $26,307 compared to $56,429.25
The benefits in defined contribution plans are usually paid out in the form
of a lump sum, allowing the retiree to invest some of the money so that it
can continue to grow and keep up with inflation. If some is used to buy an
annuity to protect against the risk of outliving the retirement savings and
some is invested to keep up with inflation, a 401(k) savings plan holds the
promise of providing retirement income that is both guaranteed for life and
can grow with inflation. In addition to small account balances, women face
several other obstacles in reaching this ideal. When buying an annuity in
Massachusetts, and most other states, because women’s life expectancy is
longer, women are charged more than men for the same coverage.
Although defined contribution plans present some advantages for women:
they are portable and they can increase in value over a lifetime, they are
still based on a work history and how much you make. As long as women
work less in the paid workforce and are paid less, they will continue to have
smaller retirement accounts. Unless we develop retirement income policies
that are not based on earned income, women will continue to have less in
retirement than men.
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FEDERAL REFORMS
As discussed above, there are very few retirement vehicles that are not
based on earned income. Two approaches that are not tied to earned income
could be used. First, government might subsidize retirement savings of lowincome people or people who have been out of the workforce to provide
caregiving and thus have short or no careers in the paid workforce, thereby
using tax dollars to create savings in addition to encouraging savings as we
do now. Second, governmental policy might create mechanisms for retirement income of married couples to be equally divided between them. The
first approach would require either new tax dollars or a shift of the tax
dollars presently used to encourage savings of those participating in pension
plans. The second approach is more mechanical and merely shifts the
retirement benefits between the members of a couple.
To some degree, we do the first. The Social Security spousal benefit is an
example of a benefit for a spouse based on the working spouse’s work. The
Social Security benefits are available for spouses without reducing the
worker’s benefits, and therefore are a subsidy to the non-working spouse.
Widow’s benefits and joint and survivor benefits, which are available only
upon the death of the retired worker, are also examples of shifting worker’s
retirement benefits to support the worker’s spouse. This approach, however,
benefits only spouses or dependents of a worker and relies on the worker
earning enough retirement benefits to share.
Other reforms are needed to address the retirement security of single
mothers and low-wage workers. Currently, a saver credit provides a tax
credit to low-wage workers who contribute to an IRA. This credit is more
valuable to low- and moderate-income workers than the tax deduction for
contributions to IRAs. Of course, in order to receive the tax credit, one must
have enough disposable income to contribute to an IRA. Many people
cannot take advantage of the credit because of a lack of disposable income.
If the credit were made into a refundable credit, much like the earned
income tax credit, more low-income workers could take advantage of it.
The proposal to have the saver credit converted to a refundable credit has
been debated since it was first established by the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), however, the most recent
federal pension reform package, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, made
the saver credit permanent without making it a refundable credit.
Those who are out of the workforce due to caregiving responsibilities for
children or the disabled often need additional help as well. Caregiving
credits have long been suggested for Social Security but never implemented.26 With Social Security facing a projected deficit by mid-century, it is
unlikely that reforms that cost the trust fund money will be seriously considered. The government could, however, institute caregiving credits to indi-
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vidual retirement accounts for people out of the workforce performing fulltime caregiving. These credits would be similar to the earned income tax
credit but would be for caregiving, not earned income.
Mechanisms that would help married couples divide retirement savings
include changes in how federal tax policy treats private pensions. Individual
pension plans are in the name of the working spouses and thus owned by
them. The Internal Revenue Code allows working individuals to “roll-over”
their 401(k)s into an IRA when they leave the employment of the company
that sponsored the 401(k), however, it does not allow the 401(k) or any
portion of it to be rolled over to a spouse’s IRA. If it did, couples could
equalize their retirement accounts, allowing women to accumulate more
retirement savings in their names even though it is the husband who has
earned the retirement money. At present, the tax-free roll-over option is
only available if one spouse is deceased or under a divorce decree.27
Allowing couples to divide pension accounts is one way to ensure more
equality in the financial decision-making of married couples. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 provided for some joint decision-making when it
required that a spouse sign a waiver if the working spouse elected a pension
distribution in any form other than a joint and survivor benefit. Implicit in
that law, was the non-working spouse’s interest in the retirement benefits of
the working spouse. Involving the spouse in the decision seemed to have
increased the election of joint and survivor options by married men. In the
years from 1980 to 1984 60 percent of married men elected a joint and
survivor benefit whereas, in 1993–94, 71 percent elected the option.28
The requirement that a spouse waive entitlement to a joint and survivor
benefit is of less importance today than it was in the 1980s when the law
was passed because of changes in the private pension landscape. Today,
more companies are offering defined contribution plans and fewer plans are
offering benefits in the form of an annuity. If the benefit is not offered in an
annuity form, the waiver requirement does not apply. The requirement to
have a spouse sign off on the distribution of a lump sum as well as the
election of a joint and survivor annuity would extend the joint decisionmaking to all plan distribution decisions. If the law allowed roll-over distributions to spouses, a non-working spouse could accumulate retirement
savings along with the working spouse. To make this a non-taxable event,
the non-participant spouse would have to be able to accept her half of the
distribution in an IRA. Such a provision would also benefit couples whose
plan is covered by the joint and survivor waiver provision but who want to
roll over the money for other reasons, such as better investment options or
consolidating retirement savings.29
The second group of reforms discussed above would benefit married
women only if the couple has enough money to divide between husband and
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wife. These reforms do not target the low-income women who are at most
risk. Some combination of governmental supports for caregivers’ retirement
and more equal division of couples’ retirement assets should be considered.
All of these ideas have the goal of creating retirement wealth for women
even when they are out of the workforce. Breaking the connection between
paid work and retirement policy must be considered if we continue to rely
on unpaid caregivers for our children, the disabled, and frail elders.
THE ROLE

FOR

STATE POLICY MAKERS

Although the federal government, to the exclusion of state and local governments, regulates most private pensions there is still a role for state government in ensuring that citizens have adequate income in retirement. State
government regulates the securities industry and the insurance industry,
both of which are central in retirement savings. As more and more retirement plans move to individual accounts and people roll over their accounts
to IRAs when they change jobs, the management and investment of that
money will involve more ordinary people in the investment world. Education of investors, disclosure of fees, and protection against conflict of interest are all areas where the state can be proactive to insure that retirees
don’t lose their savings. In particular, targeting financial education for
women has been an area that several states, including Massachusetts, have
undertaken.
With their power to regulate insurance, states can influence the retirement products that are offered. As discussed above, annuities are an important vehicle for retirees, especially women, as they guarantee a steady
stream of income until death. But annuities are expensive. Encouraging less
expensive and more flexible products could result in more people using
annuities. Requiring insurance companies to use unisex life-expectancy
tables would also reduce the cost to women.
One of the most innovative suggestions for state involvement has come
from the Economic Opportunity Institute in Washington State. They have
proposed that states create statewide pension systems that small employers
and individuals can participate in voluntarily. In such a pooled system, small
employers and individuals who have high expenses could reduce their costs
substantially. Also, employees could change jobs and still continue to accumulate credit toward a lifetime benefit. Under such a scheme, a state might
subsidize (or match the savings of) low-income workers to encourage
savings on their part.
Finally, Massachusetts could and should reform the public pension system. The general structure has not changed since it was codified in the
1940s. But the work force and its needs have changed radically; most
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notably the workforce is now more mobile. A system that assumes a lifetime
career service shortchanges many employees. Specific reforms that would
help women in the system include lowering the vesting requirement and
expanding the COLA provisions. Adding protections for spouses of state
and local workers would also help the women in this state who are married
to public employees.
CONCLUSION
Many initiatives have been proposed for reforming pension at both the state
and the federal level. Most recently, Congress passed the Pension Protection
Act of 2006, which aimed at increasing participation rates and ensuring
adequate funding of defined benefit pension plans. But neither the changes
Congress made nor the current trend in private pensions promise help for
women who are out of the workforce or have low wages. This paper suggests that unless retirement income policy is expanded beyond consideration
of what one earns over a lifetime, caregivers (typically women) will always
be poorer (and potentially very poor) in retirement. Several reforms have
been suggested to relieve some of the inequities women face. Others help
low-income workers, more than a majority of which are women. Some of
the reforms are small in nature and effect, others challenge the concept of
basing retirement on work history. For women to see substantial improvement in the disproportionate poverty in old age that they face, policy makers must start questioning the broad assumptions upon which our current
policy is based.
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